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Intergovernmental Relations in Scotland
Post-Devolution
NEIL McGARVEY
In the past few years government at every level in Scotland has been subject
to significant upheaval. In 1996 the mainland local government structure
was reformed from a two-tier structure of 53 district and nine regional
councils to 29 unitary authorities, in 1997 the Labour Party took control of
the Scottish Office after 18 years of Conservative rule and in 1999 the
Scottish Office was ‘democratised’ with the establishment of a parliament
and re-named the Scottish Executive. The rhetoric surrounding devolution
was that it represented a new dawn for Scottish politics (see McGarvey,
2001a; Mitchell, 2001 for reviews of post-devolution literature). This article
seeks to outline the changes which have taken place and seeks to assess their
implications for central–local relations in Scotland.1 Before doing so it is
necessary to set the scene and outline the pre-devolution picture of Scottish
central–local relations.
Pre-devolution as an integral part of British government, the Scottish
Office and Scottish local government have experienced the same policy
initiatives as the rest of the UK. There has, however, been some
distinctiveness in terms of administrative structure and practice, with
considerable scope for autonomy in implementation. There was a
‘tartanisation’ of UK policy initiatives by the Scottish Office. Policies
towards local government were different to a degree, but the overall
substance and rationale behind them tended to be very similar. 
The tone of central–local government relations in Scotland during the
Conservative years was similar to that of England and Wales. Numerous UK
studies have recorded the deterioration in relations between central and
local government since 1979, and the increased reliance on mechanisms of
control rather than understandings or conventions (see Dunleavy, 1997;
Hood et al., 1999; Rhodes, 1988; 1997; Stoker 1999; 2000a). The House of
Lords Hunt Report in 1996 talked of ‘incrementally soured relations,
weakened local democracy and blurred accountability’ (House of Lords,
1996: 5) in central–local relations. 
Neil McGarvey, University of Strathclyde
However, relations never quite deteriorated to the same extent in
Scotland as they did south of the border. Scottish Office oversight of local
councils has reflected its more consensual style (Midwinter et al., 1991).
This is not to say there have not been problems – Compulsory Competitive
Tendering (CCT), rate-capping, the poll tax and structural reorganisation,
all contributed to increased tensions. However, there has not been the same
corrosive lack of trust that was evident in England (see Lowndes, 1998).
The small-scale nature of central–local relations in Scotland is reflected in
the close physical proximity and the interpersonal relations between
members of the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA),
Scottish civil servants and politicians. The concept of ‘village life’ in
Whitehall identified by Heclo and Wildavsky (1981) retains a strong
resonance in Scottish central–local relations with direct contacts possible in
smaller policy networks (Midwinter and McGarvey, 2001: 847).
Post-devolution Scottish local councils are pivotal institutions for the
Scottish Executive delivering on its commitment to make a difference to
their lives of ordinary Scottish people. Local government is a key partner in
the Scottish Executive’s desire to deliver on the social justice agenda that
forms the framework of the programme for government. Councils are
critical to the executive delivering its key pledges and objectives such as
strong communities, an enterprising workforce and sustainable
development. On a broader level, councils are also important for delivering
on devolution’s objectives of strengthened democratic control and political
accountability in Scotland.
THE NEW PARLIAMENT
Before examining executive–local government relations it is worth noting
how the parliament has dealt with local government. The ‘village life’
nature of politics in Scotland, noted above, did not prevent concerns over
the impact of devolution on local government (see Alexander, 1997;
Sinclair, 1997; Himsworth, 1998). However, the devolution White Paper
(Scottish Office, 1997: para.6.7) made it clear that the government did not
envisage the parliament taking powers from local authorities.
There is no doubt, however, that the arrival of the parliament changed
the context of local government in Scotland. As the Commission on Local
Government noted: 
The arrival of the Scottish Parliament represents a fundamental
change in the political landscape within which Scottish councils in
future will operate. Although Parliament and local government each
have a democratic base, the Parliament will have the ultimate power
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of determining what becomes of local government. (McIntosh
Commission, 1999: 11)
At the UK level, the reality of central–local relations is that it is primarily
about executive–council relations. In Scotland that still appears to be the
case, though the Scottish Parliament is emerging as a more important actor
than its Westminster counterpart. The backdrop of the parliament has
heightened democratic scrutiny. The main concern pre-devolution was that
it could be a means of enhancing political control by increasing the scope of
ministerial supervision and parliamentary scrutiny of local government
beyond what was possible at Westminster. Democratic scrutiny of Scottish
local government was previously rare and is now a daily occurrence, with
numerous parliamentary committees taking an interest in the activities of
councils. The Scottish Parliament Local Government Committee generally
takes a supportive position vis-à-vis local government, but still exposes its
representatives to critical questioning. For example, the decision to hold an
inquiry into local government finance followed representations to it by Neil
McIntosh (former Strathclyde Regional Council chief executive) and
COSLA. 
However, so far the parliament’s efforts at influencing local government
have been frustrated by lack of adequate financial information. The politics
of local government finance have always been complex and moves are
under way to make financial information more transparent for the
committee. 
To date the parliament has not wielded the influence on localities it may
wish to. However, in the longer term it will increase the pressure on
localities as they seek to respond to the initiatives of the centre. This adds
to the possibility of an erosion of the powers of local government as a
consequence of devolution. The Scottish Parliament stripped many local
councils of their most able leaders, it is thus not surprising that it is difficult
to detect a strong sense of leadership within Scotland’s councils. The idea
of directly elected provosts drifted around the agenda in the late 1990s, but
it never mustered enough support within councils to be considered
seriously.
COMMISSION ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND 
THE SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT
The first debate conducted in the parliament was directly related to this
question. Prior to devolution the Scottish Office established a commission
to look into the relationship between the Scottish Parliament and local
government. The recommendations of what has become known as the
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McIntosh Report were wide-ranging, covering relations with the parliament
and ministers, electoral arrangements and electoral reform, the conduct of
council business and the role of community councils. All these elements
have an influence on relationships between local government and the
Scottish Parliament and Scottish Executive. 
The Scottish Executive accepted the overwhelming majority of the
recommendations. Following on from it numerous new bodies were
established with an explicit focus on various aspects of central–local
relations: a community leadership forum; a renewing local democracy
working group (the Kerley Group); a leadership advisory panel (the
MacNish Group). The executive and the parliament have responded to each
of the six key recommendations in the McIntosh Report. 
The first one was ‘The Parliament and the 32 councils should commit
themselves to a joint agreement – which we call a Covenant – setting out
the basis of their working relationship’. The parliament’s local government
committee invited COSLA to prepare a draft of a covenant for discussion.
COSLA’s main concern was to give local government parity of esteem in
terms of engaging with all aspects of the parliament’s work which affects
the structure, role and financing of local government. Secondary questions
were how local government should engage with constituency and list MSPs
and any special interest groups which may be set up within the parliament. 
The second recommendation was that parliament and local government
should set up a standing joint conference to be a place where
parliamentarians and local government representatives may hold a dialogue
on a basis of equality. This had led to the establishment of a community
leadership forum bringing together ministers, leaders of all 32 councils and
the convener of the parliament’s local government committee to engage in
discussion. The first meeting was held in September 1999. 
The third recommendation was that a formal working agreement should
be established between local government and the Scottish ministers. A
working agreement between local government and the Scottish Office was
drawn up soon after the general election in 1997. This has been superseded
by the partnership framework announced in May 2001 (see below). 
The fourth recommendation, that legislation should be introduced to
provide councils with a statutory power of general competence, is forming
part of the Local Government Bill going through the Scottish Parliament at
the moment. The bill will free councils from the limitations of existing rules
by allowing them more flexibility to do anything that promotes the well-
being of their area. 
The fifth recommendation has proved the most troublesome. It suggested
that an independent inquiry into local government finance should be
instituted immediately. The executive rejected this recommendation, arguing
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that there was not a proven link between the percentage of money raised
locally and the question of accountability. In any case, the scope for changing
the percentage of locally raised income was limited since localising business
rates, cutting the levels of rate support grant, or centralising local authority
services such as education were all unacceptable to the executive. The
fundamental root and branch independent inquiry was thus rejected. The
executive and COSLA did, however, agree to look jointly at the pooling of
funding streams between central government, local government and other
public bodies and to look at new ways of drawing in private sector resources.
They have also sought ways of promoting greater long-term stability in
financing, and improving financial management in, local government. 
The final McIntosh recommendation was that the option of transfer to
local government should always be considered in any review of other bodies
delivering public services; and likewise where new services are developed,
prior consideration should always be given to whether local government
should be their vehicle, subject to consideration of efficiency and cost-
effectiveness. In light of this, ministers confirmed that they have no plans to
take any major functions away from local government and under the
Scottish Executive’s review of public bodies one of the questions bodies are
required to ask themselves is: ‘Could the function be put under local
authority control?’ This was, of course, welcomed by COSLA, its stated
position being that such bodies should wherever possible be brought under
local democratic control.
KERLEY REPORT
As noted above, the Renewing Local Democracy Working Group was
established after the recommendation included in the McIntosh Report.
Appointed by Scottish ministers in July 1999, chaired by Richard Kerley (a
University of Edinburgh academic), it published its report in June 2000. The
Group was asked by ministers to consider many of the recommendations
from the McIntosh Report and suggest ways in which council membership
could be made more attractive to a wider cross-section of the community,
and how councils could become more representative of the make-up of the
community they serve. It made 36 recommendations to improve the health
of local democracy in Scotland, most relatively uncontroversial. It reviewed
the creation of a more proportional electoral system, the remuneration of
councillors and the electoral cycle. These are all aimed at promoting
accountability in local councils and making it more outward-looking, which
will make local government easier to access and easier to understand. The
suggestion in much recent literature on local governance (Stoker, 1999;
Stoker, 2000) is that accountability is a problem (see McGarvey, 2001b).
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One of the main issues it looked at was council leadership. The Kerley
Report has recommended that Scotland’s top council leaders should be paid
the same as MSPs. This is in line with the agenda in England that has
emphasised the need for new styles of leadership in local councils, with
elected leaders taking a more prominent and pivotal role (see Leach and
Wilson, 2000). 
The report also recommended more renumeration for councillors who
carry significant additional responsibilities and that at least one of these be
a councillor who is not a member of the ruling group. It also suggests that
the abolition of the salary threshold for politically restricted posts be
abolished (making the nature of each post the sole determinant of political
restriction). It advised on the appropriate numbers of members for each
council, taking account of proportionality. A minimum of 19 and maximum
of 53 members was recommended (with the exception of Highland
Council). It emphasised the importance of the ward–councillor link; fair
provision for independents; allowance for geographic diversity; and close
fit between council wards and natural communities. To broaden access to
councils, it also recommended a review of business procedures and
administrative support to facilitate councillors carrying out their role on a
part-time basis, the encouragement of greater participation of people with
disabilities, women and ethnic minorities on councils and lowering the
current age limit for standing as a councillor from 21 to 18. 
However, the central and most politically sensitive issue Kerley reported
on was that of electoral reform. The issue is very sensitive for the ruling
Labour–Liberal Democrat coalition. In considering its remit, the final
report comes down in favour of single transferable vote (STV) (with three
dissenters). It then suggests the introduction of STV with flexibility in
ward sizes – ranging from three- to five-members wards (or even two in
sparsely populated areas). This recommendation was not well received by
Labour councillors within Scottish local government. The vast majority of
Labour councillors (obviously fearful of their council membership) – some
78 per cent – are opposed to proportional representation in local
government (Clarke, 2000). In response, the executive has set up a
ministerial sub-group to consider how the executive can – or should –
respond to Kerley’s recommendations. The Scottish Local Government
(Elections) Bill introduced into the parliament in autumn 2001
incorporates many of Kerley’s recommendations, including proposals to
increase local council terms from three to four years and allow councils to
run pilot schemes to improve voter turnout and election administration. It
was silent on electoral reform. 
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LEADERSHIP ADVISORY PANEL
In the case of organisational structure, Scotland has adopted a less directive
approach than in England and Wales, where a statutory approach was taken
to prescribe a menu of options. The Local Government Act 2000 requires
most local authorities in England and Wales to choose one of three
‘modernising’ options: elected mayor and cabinet/executive; an appointed
leader and executive; or an elected mayor and council manager. All local
authorities above 85,000 in population were required to adopt an executive
model (Jones and Stewart, 2001). In Scotland there was less prescription,
although the McIntosh Report did recommend that ‘councils should give
particular consideration to formalising the political leadership as an
executive, but should also be able to consider other options’ (McIntosh,
1999: 6). 
The Commission on Local Government and the Scottish Parliament
recommended that every council carry out a review of its management of
business and working practices assisted by the Leadership Advisory Panel
(McIntosh, 1999: Chapter 5). The argument is made that the political
executive model would provide the basis for greater scrutiny and
accountability of council decision-making.
The Leadership Advisory Panel was set up in 1999 to advise councils
and outline the progress of Scotland’s 32 councils in their self-reviews of
political management arrangements, in line with the recommendations of
the Commission on Local Government and the Scottish Parliament.
Councils were thus encouraged to review their political decision-making
processes designed to enhance transparency, scrutiny, inclusiveness and
accountability. The picture presented in the final Leadership Advisory Panel
Report (2001: 4) is one 
of progress being made across the country, and a rich diversity of
models that reflects the degree to which councils have thought
carefully about developing structures suited to their particular needs.
The process has shown that councils are not just receptive to the
theory of modernisation but are actively pursuing real improvements. 
The panel based their judgement of councils’ plans for change against the
following criteria: 
• Council business should be managed in such a way that policy
proposals and matters for decision by the council are subject to open
debate. 
• The council must be able to effectively scrutinise the actions of the
leadership or executive and hold it to account for its performance. 
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• The work of the council should take place, as far as possible, in public
and free from unnecessary constraints imposed by the use of the party
whip.
• Council business should be organised in such a way which allows as
wide a cross-section of the community as possible to realistically
consider becoming a councillor
The report categorises the new structures in the 32 Scottish local councils as
fitting into one of three general categories: 
• Streamlined committee structures (n=23);
• Executives (n=6); 
• Devolved and partially devolved structures (n = 3). 
Given the McIntosh recommendation, it is perhaps surprising that so few
councils have gone down the ‘executive model’ route. Those that did
received very positive commentary in the report. The less favourable
commentary was reserved for councils which adopted a more conservative
approach to change (for example, Angus, Dundee, East Ayrshire, Glasgow
and Inverclyde). Evolution rather than revolution would be a fair summary
of the vast majority of the approaches adopted by the councils. The
executive model would appear to have been rejected by the vast majority of
Scotland’s councils. 
This is perhaps not surprising. Midwinter notes how analysis in favour
of the executive model was ‘heavily influenced by the urban situation,
where party group discipline tends to be more developed’ (2000: 2). The
concern in these areas is with group politics and patronage in Labour-
dominated central Scotland which raise questions about accountability and
transparency. Outside urban areas, in more open council systems, leaders
still have to convince councillors of the merits of their proposals. The
Widdicombe (1986) report in the late 1980s rejected the executive model,
empirical research that informed it highlighting how the bulk of committee
decisions were consensual and non-divisive (Midwinter, 2000: 3). 
BEST VALUE
Like England and Wales, Best Value is a policy that has dominated
central–local relations in Scotland. The Scottish approach to Best Value
reflects the distinctive nature of Scottish central–local relations. For the
Scottish Executive, Best Value represents the defining touchstone of the
new central–local government relationship in Scotland. A partnership
approach was developed by a Best Value task force (BVTF) which included
the executive, COSLA and the Accounts Commission. Best Value plans are
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not approved by the executive, but remain mechanisms for internal
management and public reporting. There is an absence of direct regulatory
power – Best Value is seen in the executive as a means to persuade councils
of the merits of particular approaches to management (see Midwinter and
McGarvey, 1999). The Scottish Executive has retained a ‘light touch’
oversight role reminiscent of the Scottish Office consensual style of
operation (ibid.). 
The Scottish system is less directive than the Department of Local
Government, Transport and the Regions (DLTR) (previously DETR –
Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions) in England and
Wales, with Scottish Executive ministers not acquiring the same new
specific and directive powers as their counterparts in Whitehall. For
example, in England and Wales the Best Value legislation gives central
government new powers of ‘flexible and constructive intervention’ (DETR,
1998: 31) where local authorities are failing to remedy performance failure.
No such provision exists in Scotland. There also appears to be less emphasis
on competition and open tendering, perhaps reflecting the experience of
CCT in Scotland, where the vast majority of contracts were not externalised.
Despite these differences, there are similar problems. For example, that
Best Value involves too much by way of pedagogical concern with the
examination of precise documentation, with strict adherence to specified
planning and procedures to the neglect of its aspiration. Requirements such
as the publication of local performance and service plans, the use of
performance indicators, bench marking, consultative exercises and
competition as a tool, reflect general prescribed ‘rules’ local councils should
build into their Best Value frameworks. 
The Best Value framework in Scotland (just as in England and Wales)
reflects the centralist characteristics of UK government. As successive
narratives of the post-war history of local government have argued, the
focus on internal rules, checks and procedures (process) was to the neglect
of a sufficient focus on performance. In other words, there may be a danger
that in designing Best Value frameworks councils may become overly
concerned with process as opposed to achieving better service outcomes –
the aim of Best Value. 
Moreover, the ‘in-house’ culture of many local authorities in Scotland
has not simply disappeared with the talk of modernisation. CCT highlighted
that many commercial companies are not particularly keen on working
with/for local councils which are unwilling partners. Commercial
companies tend to seek long-term partnerships characterised by trust,
reciprocity and a collaborative environment of openness and honesty, this
being far more likely to encourage innovation and improvement. The extent
to which such an environment exists in Scottish councils at present is
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questionable. There remain many Labour councillors still sceptical of the
benefits of involving commercial partners in council operations (BVTF,
para.48). As the latest BVTF report noted, ‘there are still those who
instinctively prefer or are more comfortable with direct delivery of services’
(para.47). 
There is the distinct possibility that Best Value will be absorbed by
Scottish councils in a fatalistic manner with negligible effect on service
delivery and the legacy of increased bureaucracy in the form of a new set of
internal rules, checks, procedures and reporting frameworks. It is not
difficult to imagine a scenario where councils are ‘ticking all the right
boxes’ (or, in more modernising government-speak, ‘pressing all the right
key-pads’) with little substantive effect on service delivery outcomes. Much
of the recent history of local government management reform is the story of
structural and process reform which had negligible impact on actual policy
outputs. 
Moreover, Best Value has been thrown into disrepute by the way it has
been attached to what are ultimately politically driven decisions – both
South Lanarkshire and Glasgow were earlier this year reported to be
undertaking ‘Best Value reviews’ of their COSLA membership. If this
demonstrates nothing else it is that in the final analysis decision-making in
local government is political, not managerial. 
COMMUNITY PLANNING
Community planning as a policy in Scotland began in 1998 with the
establishment of five pathfinder councils to pilot the initiative (one of the
few examples of Scotland following the English example of piloting).
Community planning is an example of ‘joined up government’ at the local
level. Lloyd and Illsey (1999) define it as best
viewed in terms of any process of public administration through
which a Council comes together with other organisations to plan,
provide for, or promote the well-being of communities they serve. In
other words, community planning represents an attempt to provide a
strategic framework for the activities of multifarious institutions
engaged in community capacity building and regeneration. 
The Community Planning Working Group report in 1998 argued that
community planning was required because of the lack of strategic structure
to existing partnerships and the requirement for a shared strategic vision for
an area and a statement of common purpose (para.11). It requires that local
councils act as facilitators of institutions involved in local governance in
order to co-ordinate policies, activities and resources to achieve shared goals. 
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By 2000 the Scottish Executive was talking of providing a statutory
basis for community planning and, in particular, to provide councils with a
power of community initiative (what had been called a power of general
competence in the commission’s report). This was welcomed by COSLA,
which has long campaigned for recognition of this role and sees the power
of community initiative as giving expression to the community leadership
role of councils by giving them more freedom to act in the interests of their
communities. Accompanied by a statutory duty of community planning, this
would confirm the central role of local authorities as the democratically
elected representatives of Scotland’s communities. COSLA also noted the
clear linkage between community planning and Best Value. Community
planning involves councils and their partners examining their service
delivery arrangements and creates opportunity for the exploitation of joint
working and innovative solutions to service delivery. 
The policy is closely linked with notions of joined up holistic
government and is also clearly linked to the executive’s priority of
delivering social inclusion. It is also linked with other ‘joined up’ initiatives
such as new community schools, healthy living centres and public–private
partnerships. All of these initiatives are designed so that Scottish local
councils become more outward in focus and better equipped to deliver more
responsive services. 
FINANCE
The Scottish Executive inherited a very centralised system of local
government finance. It is characterised by a high degree of grant
dependency, based on an inelastic property tax, under a strict capping
regime to control expenditure (Midwinter and McGarvey, 1997). The
reform emphasis has been to develop a partnership approach which assures
local delivery of national priorities and provides stability so that local
authorities can plan on a long-term basis. 
With regard to budgeting, the comprehensive spending review (CSR)
process has seen the executive working with local government representative
associations such as COSLA, SOLACE (Society of Local Authority Chief
Executives), CIPFA (Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accounting),
ADES (Association of Directors of Education) and ADSW (Association of
Directors of Social Work) in developing joint planning and co-determination
of priorities. This could be an example of the much-vaunted ‘new politics’ in
action – key political institutions seeking a consensus around expenditure that
covers key areas of national and local policy-making (Mair, 2000: 114).
However, one could argue that it is much like the old Scottish Office
consultation process, with the usual relevant and credible groups on the inside
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track. Of course, such developments are still at a very early stage – the real
test of these partnerships will come during climates of expenditure cutback
and retrenchment. At present the fiscal outlook is beginning to look less rosy
and the durability of such partnerships may be tested. 
There is an ongoing internal Scottish Executive review of local
government finance. However, this is not of the comprehensive scale
recommended by McIntosh, the focus being movement towards three-year
budgeting, grant distribution, and agreements on outcomes. Simultaneously,
the local government committee of the parliament is undertaking a wide-
ranging inquiry into local government finance. McIntosh recommended the
abolition of crude and universal capping and more stability in grant
provision to councils. The executive did not fully accept this – capping has
been relaxed although it is still kept as a reserve power. However a three-
year timetable has been introduced to give more certainty to the grant
allocation process.
Other post-devolution developments are the encouragement being given
to public–private partnership arrangements (see Hood and McGarvey,
forthcoming), the large-scale voluntary transfers (LSVT) proposed for council
housing, and the pooling of funding streams. The Scottish Executive and
COSLA are involved in a joint working group to examine ways of securing
better outcomes in terms of service delivery from existing budgets, with
emphasis on targeting resources to priorities agreed with the executive (rather
than simply to specific services). The overall aim involves linking some part
of the grant allocation to a forward plan prepared by each authority,
identifying areas and indicators of how services would be improved. 
Finance will be the real test of central–local relations post-devolution. It
is too early to assess the impact of these ongoing changes, but one is struck
by the extent to which the Scottish Executive is in control of the agenda. It
rejected the McIntosh calls for a review of finance, new monies are
increasingly earmarked and ring-fenced to reflect executive policy priorities
and capping remains as a reserve power. To the frustration of some in local
government, the executive has increasingly used ring-fencing as a lever to
ensure delivery of specific policy initiatives at a local level. Representatives
of COSLA stated in evidence to the Local Government Committee: 
virtually every penny of additional resources that has been made
available for the next three years is directed centrally by the
Executive. That puts considerable pressure on local authorities to
deliver on their core services. 
(http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/official_report/cttee/local.htm)
However, against this it should be noted that Scottish local government is
presently enjoying real growth of around 4.5 per cent in grants – the highest
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annual percentages since the mid-1970s. Moreover, the executive would
counter that the extent of ring-fencing has been much exaggerated.
According to their own figures it has only risen from eight per cent to ten
per cent of aggregate external finance – the increase being accounted for by
the excellence fund. The executive’s view is that it looks to local
government to deliver on broad, strategic national objectives and that
hypothecation which may exist at present can be abolished once local
outcome agreements are in place in areas such as personal nursing care
(Scottish Parliament, 2001).
Local government finance has been the Achilles’ heel of all the talk
about partnership and joined-up working. Finance is the root of the problem
which bedevils the central–local relationship. Local authority self-finance
expenditure remains at around 20 per cent – the high degree of dependency
weakening local autonomy and accountability. Scottish local councils
remain as dependent on national grants as their counterparts in England.
Wilson (2001: 302) refers to the ‘financial grip’ Whitehall has on English
local councils – the Scottish Executive retains a similar grip in Scotland. As
in England, no significant change in the central–local balance of funding is
on the agenda. 
The emphasis of recent reforms has been to introduce more stability with
the introduction of three-year settlements for grant allocations. Some of the
tension in central–local relations has been eased with the relaxation of
Scottish Executive financial controls. However, in terms of finance the
evidence that does exist suggests more councils are ‘overspending’ (in
terms of grant-aided expenditure – GAE) post-devolution. Between 1995/96
and 2001/2 the excess of local authority budgets over GAE has increased
from 1.6 per cent to 6.4 per cent (Midwinter, 2001). 
PARTNERSHIP FRAMEWORK
At the ‘national’ (UK) level there has been a renewed emphasis on partnership
since the election of the Labour administration in 1997. However, unlike the
UK government, the Scottish Executive has considered central–local relations
as a topic in its own right. In May 2001 the Executive Minister for Finance
and Local Government, Angus MacKay, signed a partnership framework with
COSLA. The framework document outlines the basis upon which the
executive and local government will seek to work in partnership in their
shared responsibility of serving the people of Scotland. MacKay, speaking at
the signing ceremony in Edinburgh City Chambers, said:
Signing this framework today with COSLA’s President, Norman
Murray, is a clear indication of the importance the Executive places on
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working constructively with Local Government. It is important that
we consult with each other and communicate effectively wherever
possible so that we can all deliver the levels of service that Scotland
deserves. (Scottish Executive, 2001a)
COSLA also welcomed the introduction of the partnership framework. Its
president, Norman Murray, commented: 
Partnership working between the two democratically elected levels of
government in Scotland is essential and can only be achieved through
parity of esteem, which this framework clearly defines. To work
constructively together, we must operate in a climate of openness,
transparency and trust and I believe the Framework will help us
achieve that in order to deliver the highest quality possible services to
our communities. (Scottish Executive, 2001a)
This is the first time there has been a clear written protocol between the two
levels of government in Scotland. At a symbolic level it demonstrates a
commitment to shared working. It follows the McIntosh Commission
recommendation that a formal working agreement should be established
between local government and the Scottish Executive to supersede the
informal framework for partnership working document which was put in
place after the 1997 general election. 
The partnership framework emphasises mutual respect as the foundation
of the relationship between the executive and local councils, recognising
that each other’s roles and functions are both distinct and complementary.
Operationally, this respect should manifest itself in engagement,
consultation, public announcements, and the exchange of information and
ongoing meetings between the executive and COSLA/local councils. This
would involve the establishment of such institutional devices as the
leadership advisory forum. From within local government circles the
framework is viewed as a useful device. It will remind the executive’s civil
servants and ministers of protocol and the requirement for consultation and
joint working in a wide range of policies.
DOES DEVOLUTION MATTER?
At first glance, central–local relations in Scotland appear very similar to
those in England and Wales, with partnership dominating the language in
all three countries. However, beyond the similar party political rhetoric
there is no doubt that the story of central–local relations in Scotland 
is already significantly different from that to be told about England 
and Wales. 
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The key difference in central–local relations in England and Scotland
post-devolution is that there is a discernible approach in the Scottish
Executive to the subject. It has focused on central–local relations as a topic
in its own right – not simply a by-product of policy changes in other areas.
It is possible that the smaller scale of government in Edinburgh, compared
to the fragmentation of Westminster and Whitehall, heightens its capacity to
adopt a more co-ordinated integrated approach. It also has the capacity to
make very different settlements in terms of finance than is the case in
England. Empirical data does not yet exist to make robust judgements about
how the executive has exercised this autonomy. 
Unlike in England, central–local relations in Scotland cannot simply be
viewed as a by-product of changes elsewhere. It was and remains high on
the political agenda post-devolution. Since devolution, Scotland’s new
governing institutions have had to handle a report with an exclusive focus
on parliament–local government relations (McIntosh), another dealing with
local democracy (Kerley), and a third examining managerial change
(MacNish). It has overseen Best Value and community planning task forces
bringing together executive and local government interests, published a
partnership framework as well as reviewing financial relations (albeit not
comprehensively) with COSLA. All of these developments are crucial to
central–local relations in Scotland. 
Another difference with England is that the regulatory oversight
arrangements are more ‘light touch’. Although there have been changes in
the way the Scottish Executive undertakes its oversight role, it has not gone
down the same audit and inspectoral path as England has. The Accounts
Commission does not have the same Best Value inspectoral remit as the
Audit Commission. There is no housing inspectorate in Scotland. Best
Value remains a voluntary exercise and has yet to appear on the statute
book, reform of political structures via the Leadership Advisory Panel has
been governed by suggestion and guidance, not instruction. Informal
guidance as opposed to formal instruction has been the order of the day.
This possibly reflects the intimacy and interpersonal connections that exist
in the smaller scale intergovernmental networks in Scotland. An alternative
interpretation is that the docility of local councils in Scotland means that a
light-touch approach has been sufficient. Scottish local government is
Labour-dominated and ambitious council leaders may not want to be seen
‘rocking the boat’. 
Other changes in regulatory oversight arrangements have seen the
various inspectorates and Scottish Homes experience structural and policy
change. Audit Scotland was established to combine the workings of the
Scottish division of the National Audit Office and the Accounts
Commission. The new Housing Bill will see the regulatory oversight role of
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Scottish Homes (re-named Communities Scotland) extended to local
councils. A recent consultation paper on reform of the public sector
ombudsmen system in Scotland proposes establishing a one-stop shop
combining the offices of the Scottish Parliamentary, Health Service, Local
Government and Housing Association Ombudsmen (see Scottish
Executive, 2001b)
Devolution has changed the framework that ‘governs’ Scottish local
government. There have been changes in ministerial responsibility for local
government within the executive as well as enhanced parliamentary
scrutiny of local government through the committees, including the relevant
functional committees, and local government, finance and audit. These
developments themselves have increased the transparency and
accountability of local government in Scotland. 
Devolution has also brought into sharper focus the divisions within
Scotland’s only association of local councils – COSLA. Glasgow, Falkirk
and Clackmannanshire resigned, forcing it to streamline its operation and
deliver ‘core’ services to its members to ensure it remains financially stable
and has a long-term future. It is rather ironic that, post-devolution, when
there is a constant flow of consultation documents from the executive and
numerous parliamentary committees seeking expert evidence, Scotland’s
only umbrella group for local authorities is contracting. COSLA is required
to react almost daily to new policy announcements and press releases.
Despite the ‘light touch’ regulatory approach noted above, the Scottish
Executive has imposed a clear agenda on local councils. Viewed from local
government, we have now had the Scottish Executive via the Leadership
Advisory Panel recommending how councils should organise themselves
internally, the Best Value policy imposing one managerial blueprint for all,
and the financial reforms dictating how new monies should be spent whilst
capping powers are retained. The Scottish Executive would appear to be just
as concerned as national government with dictating how councils operate
internally, even if its strategy of imposing its agenda is more subtle.
Detailed prescriptive and direct control is evident in Scotland, if a little
harder to detect. 
However, as yet, some of the concerns expressed over devolution have
not materialised – for example, loss of functions, loss of funding. The
executive’s policy priorities are health, education, roads and social
inclusion. Local government is central to the delivery of three of these and
involved in joint working and partnerships with health authorities over
community care. At present, the policy and performance management
frameworks for local government, although prescriptive at a macro-level do
not involve detailed micro-level (that is, individual authority) interventions
– local discretion largely remains in place. However, as in England and
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Wales, Scottish councils remain reliant on nationally distributed grants. The
financial reforms taking place shift the emphasis to outputs and outcomes,
with the executive prioritising spending in key areas. 
Senior government politicians and policy advisers in Downing Street
have long seen Labour local councils as the ‘Achilles’ heel’ of New Labour,
the programme of modernisation is designed to lessen their ‘electoral
liability’ status. The message from the government nationally is ‘modernise
or perish’ (Wilson, 2000: 280). Mair (2000) has noted evidence of similar
thinking in the Scottish Executive.
Whilst not resorting to the same prescription/inspection as the DTLR,
the Scottish approach does bear some resemblance to it. It would appear
politicians and civil servants in Scotland share some of the same scepticism
as their counterparts in England regarding local councils’ capacity to
deliver. The Scottish Executive appears to have a similar attitude to local
councils as its counterpart in Westminster and Whitehall. The autonomy
granted to local councils has to be earned and is conditional (Jones and
Stewart, 2002 same issue). 
Important movement took place in the understanding of the relationship
between executive and local government during the first year of the new
parliament (Mair, 2000: 109). In particular, Mair points to the McIntosh
Commission Report’s recommendation that councils should only retain
their present powers and responsibilities if they accept the executive’s
reforms. Councils have to be seen to deliver services efficiently and
effectively, improve the transparency and inclusiveness of local decision-
making and scrutinise their own performance more effectively (2000: 111).
Although recommendations concerning reform, covenants and working
agreements were agreed and carried forward, the substantive
recommendations which would have potentially limited the executive’s
control over councils were either rejected or deferred. Wilson (2001: 306)
reports a ‘strong streak of centralism’ remaining in Whitehall – the Scottish
Executive’s streak may not be as strong but it is still evident. 
Despite its success in imposing its agenda, the Scottish Executive has, at
least to date, been less successful in delivering on it. Reflecting its non-
executant capacity the executive is reliant on local councils, among others,
to deliver on its social justice agenda. To date little evidence is available, but
it is delivery across a whole range of social policy areas that will be the
yardsticks for judgements as to the success of both central–local
partnerships and devolution. 
If the evidence of the impact of Best Value and ‘modernisation’ is
anything to go by, the executive may run into difficulty. Despite the fact that
the parties that form the Scottish Executive (Labour and Liberal Democrats)
control (or are coalition partners) in 23 out of 32 council administrations the
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modernisation strategy has met firm resistance within Scottish local
government. The proposals for adopting an executive model (a cabinet
system), the failure to undertake a comprehensive review of local government
finance and the recent proposals for democratic renewal (including
proportional representation) have all been subject to criticism. The dominant
Labour group in the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities recently
rejected a move towards a proportional representation voting system.
Devolution has not and will not magic away the dilemmas of governing.
The Scottish Executive has confronted the same problem with which
Whitehall is very familiar – that of reconciling local discretion with national
priorities. The prioritisation to date has been in favour of the latter. 
Like the UK government the Scottish Executive has received much
criticism over its lack of impact of service delivery outcomes. Two-year
anniversary report cards on the Scottish Parliament and Executive were
much kinder to the former than the latter. Given the non-executant nature of
the executive it is likely that the focus of much of the attention in the next
two years will be on local councils. Failure to deliver will impose serious
strains on the much-hyped central–local partnership. 
NOTES
1. For the ongoing story of central–local relations in Scotland post-devolution see the
Constitution Unit/Economic and Social Research Council/Leverhulme Trust quarterly
reports on local government in Scotland http://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-
unit/leverh/pub.htm.
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